2024 GSR Scoreboard Best practices among SOIs: Governance, Sustainability and Resilience

State-Owned Investors continue to operate in an environment of high volatility and market uncertainty. However, the rally on global equities has been quite significant in the first six months of 2024, with both the S&P 500 and Nasdaq reaching new historical peaks on June 18, and the S&P 1200 Global rising another +11.6% this year so far. The rise in bonds and hedge funds has been more modest, with +0.5% and +5.5%, respectively. Measuring private markets is always trickier, but the related benchmarks provide us with some sense, with private equity and infrastructure rising moderately, and real estate falling -5.5% when compared to Dec’23.

The world’s largest economy, the USA, saw a +1.3% increase in real GDP in the first quarter of 2024, down from +3.4% in the fourth quarter of 2023. Importantly for investors, the US inflation rate has come down from 9.6% in 2022 to 3.3% today, and forecasted to fall to 2.0% in 2025, according to analysts. However, the Fed remains cautious, and further cuts to interest rates will likely have to wait.

The conflicts in Ukraine and in Palestine and the tensions around China and the US continue, and that means that the oil prices are still high at US$ 83 per barrel – benefitting those SWFs hailing from commodity-rich economies. The latest breakeven prices forecasted by the IMF show that Qatar, the UAE, Oman and Kuwait may enjoy fiscal windfalls this year, while Saudi Arabia and Bahrain may bear significant deficits.

All this means that SOIs are back in the green in terms of results, and that their assets under management (AuM) are at historical maximums once again, well beyond the 2021 year-end figures. For the first time in history, the AuM of SWFs has passed US$ 12 trillion, and the AuM of PPFs, has passed US$ 24 trillion.

In this context, the investment activity of the first half of 2024 signals caution. SWFs deployed US$ 64.2 billion in 135 deals, while PPFs spent US$ 31.9 billion in 101 deals. Investments are fewer, but larger on average, and the overall average size of US$ 0.41 billion per deal is the largest we have seen in many years.

In the first six months of 2024 alone, we have seen 27 mega-deals, i.e., deals of over US$ 1 billion in value invested or divested by sovereign investors. Some of the largest and most important deals included:

Investments in the first half of 2024 are again led by the “Oil Five”, i.e., Saudi’s PIF, Abu Dhabi’s ADIA, Mubadala and ADQ**, and Qatar’s QIA, which invested US$ 38.2 billion in 58 different deals. This figure is more than double of what the Maple Eight (largest Canadian funds) deployed and almost eight times what the Singaporean funds spent. While the market uncertainty has invited global funds to be cautious, Gulf-based and particularly, Abu Dhabi-based funds, have received significant windfall from oil and are more active than ever.

The pressure of sustainability goals at organization level is impacting the preferences of SOIs. In 2021, we saw for the first time investments in “green assets” (mostly renewable energy) beating investments in “black assets” (mostly, oil and gas and mining). This trend has persisted during 2022, 2023, and the first half of 2024. The buy-back of 40% of ADNOC Oil Pipelines by ADQ-backed Lunate was important and could have reversed the trend, but we saw significant activity in green investments, too. The latter included Mubadala’s investments in Australian, Indian and Japanese renewable energy, NBIM’s investments in British and Spanish wind and solar farms, and ISIF’s commitments into various regional funds and entities focused on impact and sustainability.

Next, we provide an overview of the annualized returns of State-Owned Investors during the decade FY14-FY23. Whenever possible and appropriate, returns are expressed in nominal, net of fees, and USD terms. The universe below includes 25 SWFs and 25 PPFs from 22 countries in five continents (African funds are not good at reporting returns). Over half of them close their fiscal year on December 31 and have a slight advantage for doing so. Some SOIs report rolling returns only, others offer different plans, and we include six new funds this year. Sweden’s AP7 is the winner of the year, followed by NZ Super (best performing SWF) and CPP Investments. The worst performers include stabilization (aka rainy-day) funds, which must keep a conservative allocation, and include Azerbaijan’s SOFAZ, Kazakhstan’s NF and Chile’s ESSF-PRF. These results are the baseline of our comparison between GSR scores and financial performance in pages 18-19.

During the first half of 2024, Sovereign Investors have continued to debate geopolitical considerations and their exposure to China, with two opposite views: most Western funds are bearish, while Eastern funds are bullish.  Gulf SWFs are still interested in China: Mubadala re-opened its Beijing office in 2023 to manage its US$ 10 bn JV with SAFE and CDB, and ADQ helped finance CYVN (ADDoF)’s US$ 3.3 bn investment in EV NIO. But they also see the value of the USA in their portfolios and may start conceding in sensitive sectors such as AI. The infographic below looks at 15 major SWFs and 15 major PPFs (except for those from the US and China), and compares their portfolio weights in their respective jurisdictions and in the world’s two largest economies.

 In addition to changes in AuM, investments, returns, and geopolitics, there have been other activities worth mentioning including the establishment of new sovereign funds and offices all around the world:

Besides new SWFs and offices, Sovereign Investors continue to have a significant churn ratio at the leadership level. During the first six months of the year we have seen 13 changes in CEOs, as follows:

Global SWF launched the GSR Scoreboard in 2020 as a new market reference for the governance, sustainability and resilience efforts undertaken (or the lack thereof) by State-Owned Investors. A series of events in the global markets over the past 15 years has stimulated these discussions and shifted their focus; however, we believe that these three themes are not mutually exclusive and must be considered jointly. 

Global SWF’s tool is, by design and unlike any other system, rigorous (published religiously every July 1 based on public information only), quantitative (based on 25 points), and, importantly, independent (funds do not pay to be assessed). It serves as a reality check for asset owners, enabling them to compare themselves with peers and improve their practices, and it allows other market participants to look at their partners objectively. It is only through such comprehensive and routine analysis that we can identify the virtues – and vices – of SOIs.

The Rating System:

The GSR Scoreboard is comprised of 25 different elements, 10 of them related to Governance issues, 10 of them related to Sustainability issues, and five related to Resilience issues. These questions are answered binarily (Yes / No) with equal weight based on publicly available information only, and the results are then converted into a percentage scale for each of the funds. The study is applied to a universe of the world’s Top 100 SWFs and Top 100 PPFs (“Global SWF’s Top 200”), generating 5,000 data points, and repeated annually.

The 2024 edition of the GSR Scoreboard modifies three sustainability elements, in an effort to incorporate contemporaneous issues such as adherence to frameworks and commitment to net-zero goals, and re-organizes the elements in sub-categories, so that the reader can easily follow the rationale.

This year, in an effort to make sure we cover all bases, we have undertaken a comprehensive literature review and comparison with other existing and past frameworks on governance and sustainability of SOIs.

Governance-related frameworks:

• Santiago Principles, GAPPs (International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds, IFSWF)

The Santiago Principles, written in 2008*, provide a set of guidelines around governance and accountability for SWFs. The set of 24 generally accepted principles and practices (GAPPs) are split into pillars (legal, institutional, investment) and the member funds (38 full members and 10 associate members at the time of writing this report) undertake a qualitative self-assessment every three years (2016, 2019, 2022) to re-evaluate compliance.

The GSR Scoreboard incorporates most of the Santiago Principles among its governance elements in a stricter and more contemporaneous manner, with emphasis on the fund's resilience. For example, in addition to inviting SWFs to disclose their fiscal rules (GAPP #4, and GSR #2), the GSR analyzes whether there is an actual mechanism to avoid depletion (GSR #21). Responsible investing concepts are absent in the Santiago Principles.

* In October 2023, Global SWF led a group of experts urging for the reformulation of the Santiago Principles, after 15 years of existence. We understand that the IFSWF is working on a new strategy review, to be issued in November 2024.

• Truman Scoreboard (Peterson Institute for International Economics, PIIE)

A framework by leading economist Edwin (“Ted”) Truman was developed in parallel to the Santiago Principles and enhanced over the following decade. In its latest version, the Truman system scores 64 SWFs according to 33 different elements relative to structure, governance, transparency and accountability, and behavior. There have been five rounds (2007, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2019) of this scoreboard, which seems to be discontinued now.

The GSR Scoreboard aligns with the Truman Scoreboard’s emphasis on transparency and accountability, and also on behavior, or resilience. Mr. Truman also covers certain ESG concepts, such as corporate responsibility and ethical standards, which are included in GSR’s sustainability section. The latest paper around the Truman scoreboard, published in 2021, found a strong correlation (0.75) between the system and the GSR Scoreboard.

• Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index, LMTI (Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, SWFI)

The LMTI of the SWF Institute emphasizes straightforward and essential transparency practices for SWFs, with a 10-point index that encourages a minimum of 8 points for the fund to claim adequate transparency. The frequency and date of the latest revision is unclear from SWFI’s website. The LMTI was poised to evolve to a so-called SWFI Impact and Transparency Index, but the formulation of the latter is also unclear from public sources.

The GSR Scoreboard includes in its governance section all of LMTI’s elements, except for those asking for the fund to manage its own web site, and for the fund to provide the office location, a telephone number and a fax. The current version of the LMTI index finds an average score of 6.7 across 49 existing funds, with a strong correlation with the 2024 GSR scores (0.58), and especially, with the 2024 GSR governance scores (0.69).

• Global Pension Transparency Benchmark, GPTB (CEM Benchmarking, Conexus Financial’s Top1000funds)

The GPTB evaluates the largest five pension funds (public or otherwise) of 15 selected countries, focusing on four different factors: cost (41 questions), governance (35), performance (46), and responsible investing (53). For each of the 75 funds, CEM and Top1000funds respond to the 175 questions, which have different weights and scales. The survey is repeated every year since 2021, and the fourth edition will be published in October 2024.

The GSR Scoreboard, applied to public pension funds, incorporates similar elements than the GPTB, ensuring a comprehensive evaluation of governance and sustainability practices. If we exclude the 30 private pension schemes that Global SWF does not cover, we find positive correlations between GPTB’s and GSR’s governance scores (0.35), and especially, between GPTB’s and GSR’s sustainability scores (0.89) and overall scores (0.83).

Sustainability-related frameworks:

• Framework Companion Document (One Planet Sovereign Wealth Fund Working Group, OPSWF)

The OPSWF network was established in 2017 by six SWFs to consider climate-related risks and opportunities and to support the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Similar to the IFSWF,  it promotes a voluntary framework with three main pillars: alignment, ownership and integration. Since then, 13 other SWFs have joined (and one left), and it is yet unclear if the group will promote regular self-assessments, similar to the Santiago Principles.

The OPSWF’s three guiding principles are well aligned with the SGR Scoreboard’s sustainability categories (alignment = policies; ownership = reporting; integration = action), although there are no scores to compare, and the GSR focuses on the practical implementation, e.g., the existence of ESG teams, and the investment in emerging managers and/or markets. Governance and resilience concepts are not in the scope of the OPSWF.

Note: The OPSWF has been spearheaded by France’s current government and it is unclear what effect, if any, a defeat in France’s legislative elections, ongoing at the time of writing this report, may have in the future of the initiative.

• Assessment Reports (United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment, UNPRI)

The UNPRI, established in 2006, facilitates two kinds of reports for asset owners that are signatory members: the Transparency Report, which is publicly available for all funds in an online depository; and the Assessment Report, which is shared privately to each of the funds, and can be shared online if the fund decides so. The UNPRI guidelines emphasize ESG considerations, responsible investment policies, and stewardship practices.

The GSR Scoreboard aligns quite well with the Assessment reports (e.g., NZ Super’s), which focus on policy, governance, strategy, and confidence-building measurements at overall level; and on approach, selection, appointment and monitoring at asset class level. Relevant GSR Scoreboard’s sustainability elements include the integration of climate-related risks, the formation of dedicated ESG teams, and the alignment with SDGs.

• ESG Integration Scoreboard (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD)

In 2022, UNCTAD undertook an analysis of the sustainability integration practices by institutional investors. Of the 100 funds (70 PPFs, 30 SWFs) initial universe, the UNCTAD team ruled out 53% for not reporting ESG integration, and undertook a scorecard exercise of the remaining sample (38 SWFs, 7 PPFs). The 25-element system focused on governance, policies, strategy, climate action, ESG integration, and evaluation and reporting.

The GSR Sustainability elements perfectly match with those included in UNCTAD’s ESG integration scorecard. When comparing the results of both systems, the correlation is still positive although a bit lower at 0.40 (ESG scoreboard vs GSR’s sustainability) and at 0.43 (ESG scoreboard vs overall GSR). The lower numbers are natural given that UNCTAD runs the numbers for the best scorers (those that do pursue ESG integration) only.

• Responsible Asset Allocator Initiative, RAAI (New America, Bretton Woods II, Fletcher School at Tufts U.)

The RAAI index was developed in 2019 as a framework of 20 questions around responsible investing and ESG, to be responded binarily (Yes/No) for 197 institutional investors (50 SWFs and 147 PPFs), with an average score of 47%. The analysis was again repeated in 2021 but simplified significantly with only 10 questions and 121 funds (60 SWFs, 61 PPFs), only to find a lower average score of 44%. The index has now been discontinued.

The GSR Scoreboard’s Sustainability elements cover all questions raised by the RAAI index. Governance and resilience concepts are not in the scope of the RAAI. Considering the 2021 version of the latter, with 121 funds in scope, we find significant correlations between GSR Scoreboard’s sustainability scores and the RAAI index scores (0.69) and between GSR Scoreboard’s overall scores and RAAI index scores (0.62).

Appendix 3 includes a comparative table with the equivalence of GSR Scoreboard’s questions with the elements of all of the above mentioned frameworks.

Response and Acceptance of GSR:

Just like we did in 2022 and 2023, this year we communicated the preliminary results to the funds, which had six weeks to respond with any comment or additional information. Discussing the system and what we seek in each of the elements is a win-win. On the one hand, the funds follow best practices and become better governed, sustainable and resilient as they pursue higher scores. On the other hand, we accomplish our mission of contributing to the advancement of the industry.

Of the 200 funds that were assessed, we sent the scores to 192 of them, as the others do not even have contact information in their websites. Half of those have engaged in some way or form during the past three years. In total, we have had calls and further exchanges with 66 Sovereign Investors, which debated some of the points and provided us with new links, some of which ended up in increasing their scores. This year, six of the world’s largest 10 SWFs debated and increased their scores. Others, including GIC, KIA and ICD continue to rule out that chance.

A necessary disclaimer is that some of the assessed funds may be our existing or past clients, and that we as a firm may have a stronger relationship with some funds than with others. Of the Top 200 SOIs that were rated in 2024, over 33 of them are or have been subscribers of our data platform, and/or have had students in our SWF Academy. In addition, we have featured interviews with 50 Sovereign Investors since July 2020 (one per month, religiously published every first day of the month), and we have done in-person presentations in the offices or at joint events to almost 70 of them. However, all 200 funds are treated equally and given the same opportunities when it comes to the GSR exercise, which we carry out free of commission and compensation.

In addition to the practical implications, the GSR Scoreboard has rapidly become a central part of the academic research about SWF best practices. Some of the top academic journals and books that mention and study the GSR include:

• Ghahramani, ”Institutional Framework and Governance Structure of Sovereign Wealth Funds”, Palgrave 2024 (link)

• Stephens, ”Leveraging Sovereign Wealth Funds for Soft Power”, Palgrave 2024 (link)

• Battiston, Sarkar, Spieler, “Sovereign Wealth Funds and Climate Change”, Palgrave 2024 (link)

• Beatson, Ball, “European and Asian Sovereign Wealth Funds”, Palgrave 2024 (link)

• Xu, “Sovereign Wealth Funds on Four Continents”, Palgrave 2024 (link)

• Conners, “Investment Strategies of GCC SWFs: Aligning National Development and Geopolitical Goals, AUC 2024 (link)

• Bortolotti, Loss, van Zwieten, “The times are they a-changin’? Tracking SWFs’ sustainable investing”, JIBP 2023 (link)

• El-Sholkamy, Rahman, “Harnessing SWFs in Emerging Economies toward Sustainability”, Cambridge 2022 (link)

• Dahlan, Lastra, Rochette, “Research Handbook on Energy, Law and Ethics”, EE 2022 (link)

• Marie, Mazarei, Truman, “SWFs Are Growing More Slowly, and Governance Issues Remain”, PIIE 2021 (link)

• Wurster, Schlosser, “SWFs as Sustainability Instruments? Disclosure of Sustainability Criteria“, MDPI 2021 (link)

• Smith, “The fragile state of Globalization”, Laburnum 2021 (link)

• Megginson, Lopez, Malik, “The Rise of State-Owned Investors: SWFs and PPFs”, ARFE 2021 (link)

In this fifth edition of the GSR Scoreboard, we rate 200 SOIs hailing from 80 different countries. By consolidating the data at national level, we can look at the countries that run their funds in the best manner.

The top tier list, with a GSR of over 66% (depicted in blue in the map of pages 20-21), includes countries in the Americas (Canada, Panama), Europe (Ireland, Spain, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Greece, France, Germany, the UK, Switzerland, and Finland), Middle East (Turkey), Africa (Nigeria, South Africa, and Angola), and Asia (South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand), and Oceania (New Zealand, and Australia). The elite club does not include Japan or the USA, which falls short in sustainability.

Countries with several funds are more likely to be in the middle of the table, as not all of them are managed in the same manner, especially when SWFs are mixed with PPFs.

The bottom part of the table includes countries that have in our sample only one sovereign investor, which has performed poorly. Some of them include recently created funds such as Namibia’s Welwitschia Fund, Djibouti’s FSD, and Cyprus’ NIF, and others are stabilization funds with very little information, such as Botswana’s Pula, Peru’s FEF, and Mongolia’s FHF-FSF.

The exception to this rule is Russia. The two Russian SWFs have found themselves subject to strong sanctions, which has affected their transparency and operations. NWF has resumed publishing its monthly stats through the Ministry of Finance, but RDIF has now limited the information available in its website and is no longer a member of the IFSWF for Santiago Principles.

Credit Ratings:

We tested the relevance and correlation between the national-level GSR scores and the credit ratings for the sovereign debt, as measured by the three top agencies: Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch. The ratings are converted into numbers and averaged for all countries. Ten territories are not rated by any agency: Palestine, Nauru, Iran, Libya, Timor-Leste, Guyana, Bhutan, Djibouti, Monaco, and Brunei. The resulting list of numeric ratings indicates a moderate positive linear relationship between the GSR scores and the average credit ratings, at 0.50.

Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI):

Transparency International (a German non-profit founded in 1993 by former employees of the World Bank) publishes an annual index that ranks 180 countries and territories according to the perceived levels of their public sector corruption. From our sample, four territories are not rated by the CPI: Palestine, Nauru, Monaco and Brunei. The correlation with the GSR is slightly stronger at 0.55.

Freedom House (FH) Index:

Freedom House (a DC-based non-profit founded in 1941) monitors the state of freedom and democracy around the world and rates people’s access to political rights and civil liberties in 210 territories annually. This is the most comprehensive index, and it rates all 81 countries in our study. However, the correlation with the GSR is lower at 0.40.

Institutional investors are increasingly aware of the importance of embracing good governance, green policies, and strong resilience in their daily operations as investment organizations. Following best practices can have an effect on the financial performance of these investors in the long term, as demonstrated below.

In this section, we compare two datasets: the 2024 GSR scores of each of the Top 200 SOIs, including the sub-scores around governance, sustainability and resilience; and the 10 year annualized returns (FY14-FY23) for the same 100 SWFs and 100 PPFs. The performance analysis always comes with some caveats:

• Returns are actual whenever possible - if returns are not available, we estimate them based on benchmarks;

• Some funds only report returns on a rolling basis, so we relay on our estimates for the 10-year returns;

• SOIs have different fiscal years and those reporting in March and June have historically had a disadvantage;

• SOIs report in different currencies and terms – if possible, we look at returns in USD and nominal terms; and

• FY14-FY23 was a great decade for investing and favored the funds with a higher weight in US equities.

The first comparison is between 2024 GSR scores and 10-year returns across regions. As observed in the table below, the highest correlation factor is found in Oceania: Australian superannuation funds prove that strong governance and sustainability can lead to superior returns. The contrary is also true: Latin American and African funds have still work to do when it comes to best practices, and that gets reflected in lower returns. North American funds have strong governance & returns but poorer sustainability, so the correlation is lower.

The second comparison can be done between 2024 GSR scores and 10-year returns across missions. Stabilization funds present almost no correlation between best practices and returns, given the poor efforts around sustainability. Savings funds, however, which represent the most sizeable group of SWFs with US$ 7.1 trillion AuM, have a much stronger relationship, and those that perform better, normally follow best practices. Lastly, strategic and pension funds have similar correlations, with the latter performing better than the former.

This year’s scoreboard is led by five SOIs: a state investor from Asia (Temasek), two pension managers from North America (CDPQ, BCI), a superannuation fund from Oceania (NZ Super), and a strategic fund from Europe (ISIF), all with 100%.

The extended leaderboard on page 22 features 10 sovereign funds and 20 pension funds with scores between 92% and 100%. Most of the funds in this selected group hail from developed markets: 7 from North America, 14 from Europe, 2 from Developed Asia and 3 more from Oceania. Only four funds are from countries known as emerging markets: NSIA from Nigeria, GPF from Thailand, PIF from Saudi Arabia, and Mubadala from the UAE.

These 30 leaders manage a total of US$ 7.4 tn in capital, over 25% of the capital assessed this year. They lead the way in terms of best practices, with an average 9.5/10 G score, an average 9.6/10 S score, and an average 4.5/5 R score.

We note significant progress beyond the leaders: among the funds that were rated in both 2023 and 2024, although more stable than previous years: 46 of them got higher marks, and only 4 got lower marks. Some distinctions include:

• Indonesia’s ESSS (+28%) is the world's most extensive insurance system with around 250 million members. In the past year, the fund has made giant strides in terms of sustainability, with an annual report that provides specific metrics and progress, details on impact investing and reference to SDGs.

• Israel’s CIF (+24%) is in its second year of operations, and is receiving significant windfall from the oil operations in the Tamar-Leviathan gas fields. The second annual report sheds significant light into the fund’s structure, especially around governance, legitimacy and long term resilience to crises.

• China’s CIC (+16%) is a great example of a well established fund that has identified areas to be improved, and is acting on them. The fund has been working on mechanism construction, institutional capacity building, and information disclosure optimization, and the new score reflects these efforts.

• Turkey’s TVF (+16%) has improved its GSR score by 60% in the past five years. The improvement this year is mainly due to a growing and more meaningful sustainability section in the annual report, which shares a number of initiatives and efforts around ESG policies, risk management and journey.

• UAE’s ADQ (+12%) is among the top 5 positive changes for second year in a row. The newest SWF in Abu Dhabi is pursuing best practices and, in May 2024, it published significant details about its governance and balance sheet, coinciding with the listing of its inaugural bond issuance in London.

Disclaimer about the GSR scoreboard:

Global SWF’s GSR scoreboard should not be considered an endorsement of certain sovereign entities over others, and it is not necessarily a reflection of current or future events. Some funds may have ticked certain boxes but that does not make them more trustworthy, stable, or successful. Sadly, government-related investors will always have a degree of uncertainty, and GSR scores are not necessarily indicative of future results or success.

This year we highlight the position of 10 major funds and showcase the leader in each of the regions:

North America (43 funds, 68% average score):

US-based sovereign investors (62% average score) are significantly behind Canadian funds (87%), and especially, the Maple 8 (93%), led by “perfect scorers” CDPQ and BCI. US retirement systems maintain strong levels of governance and transparency; however, responsible investing has not traditionally been a priority, and most pension systems are significantly underfunded. In 2024, the inclusion of the three new sustainability elements has affected negatively US funds, with only a handful having committed to net-zero goals or adhering to best practice ESG frameworks. There is a glimpse of hope though, as the three largest state-level funds, CalPERS, CalSTRS, and NYSCRF have been making headway and achieved a 100% in sustainability scores. In the years to come, we expect Canada’s Maple 8 funds as well as the largest US retirement funds to converge around 100% overall GSR scores, while smaller US pensions and sovereign may take a bit longer.

Latin America (10 funds, 43% average score):

Latin America continues to be the worst region in terms of GSR – and continues to worsen, from 45% in 2023 to 43% this year. The reason is the inclusion of Brazil’s forum of regional SWFs (FFSB), which is still being formed. Most funds in the region are focused on stabilization and resilience and therefore tend to be less ESG-focused. The exception to the rule is Brazil’s largest pension fund, PREVI, which increased its sustainability score from 5/10 to 7/10 thanks to the publication of a ESG report with proper metrics and developments.

The good news on the resilience side is that certain funds that were heavily withdrawn during Covid-19 (Mexico’s FEIP, Colombia’s FAE-FAEP, Peru’s FEF, Chile’s ESSF-PRF and T&T’s HSF) are back on their feet, and that Panama’s FAP, the best scorer in the region, recently received promissory notes from the government totaling US$ 1.3 billion, corresponding to well-overdue revenues from the Panama Canal. The law establishing the SWF pledged 50% of the net income from the canal, above 2.25% of GDP, to flow into FAP.

Europe (44 funds, 73% average score):

In Europe there is a high disparity in results given the heterogeneity of countries, types of SWFs and pension systems. Among sovereign funds, which had a 60% average score in 2024, best practices are found in Ireland (ISIF), Norway (NBIM), and Spain (COFIDES). Pension funds had an 83% average score in 2024, led by funds in the Netherlands (PGGM, APG), Sweden (AP-Fonden, Alecta), and Denmark (PFA, PensionDanmark). Overall, the average score of the European SOIs increased from 71% in 2023 to 73% in 2024.

Four European SOIs managed to increase their scores by 12%, i.e., meeting 3 new elements. In the UK, the British Business Bank (BBB), increased visibility over its different funds and external manager selection, including emerging managers. In Germany, KENFO, which was the first SWF to commit to net-zero, published a detailed Sustainability report with specific metrics. Smaller strategic funds, such as Poland’s PFR and Slovenia’s SSH also benefitted from an increased focus on ESG, with new reports and reference to SDGs and climate risk.

MENA (31 funds, 48% average score):

Middle Eastern funds have experienced the largest improvement in GSR scores globally, from 32% in 2020 to 48% in 2024, despite the inclusion of stricter sustainability elements this year. The most positive trajectories this year have been observed in Israel’s CIF, which continues to grow and to improve its best practices, and in Turkey’s TVF, which paid special attention to enhancing ESG and risk management. Abu Dhabi’s ADQ saw its governance score increase significantly too, thanks to their recent bond prospectus.

If we consider the 22 funds from the GCC, which manage US$ 5.2 tn in assets, we observe a significant improvement, with nine of those funds scoring better this year. PIF continues to lead the charge and has come a long way, increasing its score from 28% in 2020, to 96% today. The Saudi fund publishes on a voluntary fashion an allocation and impact report and a self-assessment to the Santiago Principles, despite not being an IFSWF member. Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala is following closely and will publish its first annual impact report in H2 2024.

Sub-Saharan Africa (13 funds, 50% average score):

Sub-Saharan African funds are getting much better at governance, sustainability, and resilience, and today, the region presents better average scores than Latin America and the MENA region. This year, the average score increased from 49% to 50%, thanks to the improvements of Gabon’s FGIS and Mauritius’ MIC around sustainability, and to Senegal’s FONSIS around resilience. The only negative note was brought by Botswana’s Pula Fund, which lost its only sustainability point due to the introduction of the new elements.

Nigeria’s NSIA continues to lead in the continent, only missing the point relative to net-zero commitments. The fund confirmed that it is currently conducting a carbon footprint assessment in order to determine the baseline emissions from which to build the net-zero strategy, targets, and timeline. The only funds to have committed to such goals in the continent so far are Gabon’s FGIS (which is a signatory member of the NZAOA), and South Africa’s pension manager PIC, which scored 9/10 elements in sustainability.

Asia (43 funds, 52% average score):

Asian investors have also increased their average score from 51% in 2023 to 52% in 2024, despite the inclusion of newer or low-scoring funds such as the Philippines’ Maharlika, and Bhutan’s DHI. But there are many reasons to celebrate: Indonesia saw its pension fund ESSS and its sovereign fund INA increase their sustainability scores significantly, due to new ESG reports and metrics. And China’s CIC, the world’s second largest SWF, added four elements to 80% due to renewed efforts around responsible investing and resilience.

Temasek continues to be the reference in the region, and scored all three new elements around ESG. Fellow Singaporean institution GIC is also pushing its sustainability agenda and added a point by providing details around its decarbonization strategies in its annual report. Other Asian funds with impressive performances included Thailand’s GPF, South Korea’s KIC, and Japan’s GPIF. On the other end of the spectrum, we find China’s SAFE, Kazakhstan’s NIC and Brunei’s BIA, which continue to disclose as little as possible.

Oceania (16 funds, 80% average score):

Oceania is, once again, the region with the highest average score: 80%, up from 79% in 2023. Superannuation funds, including those SWFs designed to complement such schemes such as NZ Super and Future Fund, maintain robust governance and resilience. Among state-level managers, Victoria’s VFMC (VFF, ESSSuper) continues to lead the way, followed by NSW’s TCorp (NGF, StateSuper) and Queensland’s QIC. The consolidation of the industry (ART, Aware Super) will continue to create larger funds with better GSR scores.

Most funds maintained their 2023 scores, except for REST, which increased its resilience by covering liquidity shocks in its investment guide, and VFMC itself, which started to report its impact investments. New Zealand’s NZ Super continues to lead with a perfect score, 100%. All funds in Oceania perform exceedingly well in disclosure, as none of the funds failed to report annual accounts, investment figures and returns. Moreover, they have a robust resilience framework and are up to date with the latest sustainability practices.

One of the leaders of this year’s assessment is the New Zealand Superannuation Fund (NZ Super), which has for the past two years achieved a perfect score and is usually cited as an example of best practices globally.

NZ Super sets very high governance standards: it keeps double-arm’s length independence from government and  impressive transparency practices, by disclosing its returns monthly and its holdings, biannually.

NZ Super is also a champion in sustainability: its low-carbon portfolio has outperformed the reference portfolio (“climate alpha”) and, in 2023, it reduced its carbon footprint by 60% as measured by emissions intensity.

Lastly, NZ Super is very focused on resilience over the (very) long-term: it projects its balance sheet to year 2119, when it expects to reach US$ 1.7 trillion despite government withdrawals, which will start in 2035/36.

We had the pleasure of sitting down with Anne-Maree O’Connor, Head of Sustainable Investment, to discuss the GSR scoreboard’s results, the keys for NZ Super’s success, and the future ambitions of the institution.

[GSWF] In the past decade, NZ Super has been the world’s best performing SWF, with 10.8% annualized return – what would you say your organization’s main success factors are?

[NZSF] We have been around for about 20 years now and our long horizon has allowed us to take advantage of short-term volatility and the lack of withdrawals, while staying long-term in our objective. We also believe our governance structure with double arm’s length and our operational independence allows us to operate in a prudent but commercial manner. In addition, since 2010, we have adopted a total portfolio approach, which aims at constructing a portfolio that meets our overall objective and generates a collaborative culture and expertise across the different asset classes. Lastly, our sovereign status gives us access to opportunities that may not be necessarily available to other investors.

[GSWF] Two thirds of NZ Super’s portfolio is invested in line with an 80/20 index-link reference portfolio. In what asset classes or situations does the fund try to invest more actively?

[NZSF] The benchmark mainly signals our risk appetite, but the actual portfolio is both active and passive. Around two-thirds of the Fund is invested passively, and we only undertake active investment when we have a high level of confidence that it will be, over the long term, better than investing passively. These include direct arbitrage, event-driven opportunities, active equities (NZ), tactical credit and strategic tilting, which has added US$ 2.8 billion in value since inception. We also invest in less liquid opportunities including real assets – infrastructure, real estate, rural and timber – and in private equity. We continuously review where we can add value and what we can invest actively in.

[GSWF] Over half of your actual portfolio is invested in the US, and less than 4% is invested in China. How do you see the current tensions, and how does NZ Super look at geopolitical risk?

[NZSF] We do not really allocate by country, just in the way we do not allocate fixed amounts by asset classes. If you compare our actual portfolio with the reference portfolio, you can see that we are a bit overweighted in New Zealand and Australia, and underweighted in North America and Asia, excluding Japan. Geopolitics is an important risk factor and we are monitoring the situations in the Middle East, Ukraine, etc. We have an economics team that sits within asset allocation and looks at it quite closely. Our exposure to emerging markets is mainly via multi-factor, on the liquid side.

[GSWF] In the past five years, NZ Super’s staff has grown 53%, from 139 to 213 – why such significant growth? Do you think that personnel will or should keep growing at the same pace as the portfolio?

[NZSF] We don’t think the personnel should grow at the same pace as the portfolio, but it is true that it has grown significantly in the past few years. We are looking at building a robust platform for a portfolio of NZ$ 300 billion (US$ 184 billion) by year 2050, with capabilities around technology systems, risk management, etc. We have also internalized some of the investment to teams where we thought it made commercial sense in terms of cost efficiency, although we expect to continue our partnerships with external parties and co-investors, too. In sum, it is all about building for the future, including some increase in insourcing.

[GSWF] Let’s now look at the three different aspects of the GSR Scoreboard for NZ Super:

Governance (“G”):

[GSWF] NZ Super maintains a strong governance mechanism, with a Board of Guardians that is independently chosen and that operates at “double-arm’s-length” – what does this entail?

[NZSF] The first arm is that the Board of Guardians is selected by an independent nominating committee; and the second arm is that the investment decisions are taken independently. In other words, we are accountable to the government, but operationally independent. The Minister of Finance can give directions to the Guardians regarding the risk-return balance or performance expectations – but these must be non-binding and consistent with the duty to invest the funds on a prudent, commercial basis. The Board of Guardians consist of five to seven members, all chosen for their experience, training, and expertise in the management of financial investments – and appointed for a term of up to five years.

[GSWF] NZ Super one of the very few SWFs publishing monthly returns and portfolio holdings every six months – why is transparency and accountability so important for a sovereign fund?

[NZSF] Culturally, New Zealand does place a high value on transparency, and as a crown entity, we must abide by the freedom of information requirement. Transparency has been very helpful for us to maintain confidence with our stakeholders, and it is a quid pro quo, as the confidence has also been placed on us to manage the money. It also makes our life easier by minimizing the questions we receive, and it also allows us to attract and retain employees, as it allows us to publicize our activities and inspire young professionals. Lastly, we are a high growth fund that may have volatile results, and in those times, we need to spend time preparing and walking our stakeholders through any negative result.

Sustainability (“S”):

[GSWF] The fund managed to reduce its emission intensity and its fossil fuel reserves by 60% and 99% in 2023 – can you please share more about NZ Super’s approach to decarbonization?

[NZSF] We have had a climate strategy in place since 2016 and we started by setting up targets gradually. One objective is to reduce the risk of carbon in the portfolio but also to encourage reduction in emissions by our portfolio companies. In 2022, we decided to shift from internally customized indices to off-the-shelf Paris-aligned indices for our benchmark, especially for passive investments in global equities. In this way, we reduced our carbon footprint but retain our weighting in high-carbon intensity sectors through companies that demonstrated that they would take action against climate change through transition plans – for example in the materials sector building out opportunities in green steel or green aluminium. In fact, New Zealand has produced green aluminum for decades due to our high renewable energy mix.

We also invest in assets that facilitate the transition to a low-carbon economy, including renewable energy and real estate. We engage with companies globally, and we have a lot of conversations around their transition plans. Shifting to Paris-aligned indices sends a strong message to the market and encourages active change as companies track their inclusion. The underpinning principle is that we would take undue risk as an asset owner if we didn’t take any action against climate change. Therefore, we engage with businesses, leaders and policy makers, to assess the economic damage that would be done if we didn’t engage in the climate change transition to a global low-carbon economy. The runway for action is running out and we are pleased that renewables is performing better than anyone thought back when we first focused on investing in those opportunities.

[GSWF] Your exclusion list grew to 243 companies and 15 territories in 2023 – can you please share more about the decision of engagement vs exclusion, and how does the process work in practice?

[NZSF] Our exclusion list is quite comprehensive because it includes products that may be illegal or prohibited in New Zealand and by international treaties or are the focus of significant national and international policy to phase out use such as with tobacco. On the company side, we are a universal owner, and we really believe in active stewardship, so we monitor our portfolio companies on their environmental and corporate governance practices through providers such as MSCI and ISS. We try to apply change through our engagement  efforts, whenever possible but it can be a long process. So, sometimes we would consider how likely the company is to respond to our feedback or suggestions, and consider the size of the holding before we decide whether to engage or to divest. We don’t exclude countries except for those sanctioned by the UN Security Council and our government.

Resilience (“R”):

[GSWF] NZ Super has recently changed its Chair and its CEO, and is in the process of changing its CIO, too. How will you ensure continuity of current policies and resilience to changes in leadership?

[NZSF] Our new Chair, John Williamson, has been on the Board for eight years, so he does provide continuity, and our leadership team has been around for on average a decade or so, so there is plenty of institutional knowledge within the management. Our organisational strategy, which our new CEO has been involved in launching, is also important from a continuity point of view – it aims to build on what has made us successful while ensuring we make decisions that will keep us moving in the right direction. There is a very formal process to any change, as we have a statement of investment policy, standards and principles, which is signed by the Board every year. We also have an excellent induction programme so, anyone coming into the Fund will have a strong sense of our journey so far and will be brought up to speed rapidly. Finally, we have a very strong purpose which has allowed us to meet our mandate.

[GSWF] We are often questioned how we define Resilience in the context of Sovereign Investors. Can you please share how NZ Super looks at resilience and at new, potential “black swan” events?

[NZSF] We are always looking at our liquidity strategy and at tail-risk events. Recently in our investment committee there has been a strong focus on liquidity risk, and we utilize all types of reverse tests to see how liquidity plays out, and we go back to our Board to assess our risk appetite. Therefore, when looking at investment opportunities, we do not only look at risk and return, but also at how we allocate our risk capital or budget, thanks to those stress tests.

The other element of resilience is about sustainable finance and climate change in particular, and we look at transition risk and physical risk. We believe adopting a sustainable approach makes our portfolio more resilient, too. The discipline of testing different climate and economic scenarios are also fundamental to our resilience as an organization.

Governance: 10 elements (into brackets, % of SOIs that scored every element)

Structure

#1 – Mission & vision: Does the Fund clearly state its mission, objective, or purpose? (100%)

This is the simplest element to address. The fund’s purpose is at the core of its existence, and most SOIs state their objectives on their website. Those that do not maintain a website do it through other public channels. This was one of the very few points scored by Malaysia’s KWAN, Malta’s MGI, or Mongolia’s FHF-FSF.

#2 – Deposit & withdrawal rules: Does the Fund clearly state how it is funded and possibly withdrawn? (80%)

  #2 for SWFs: Do we know how the fund gets its capital from and how is it possibly withdrawn?

  #2 for PPFs: Is there a statement for the contributions and distributions made to pensioners?

This element is aligned to question #21 but seeks transparency rather than resilience. 71% of the SWFs, including most IFSWF members, disclosed how they are funded and potentially withdrawn, while 89% of the public pension funds provided the most recent statement of annual contributions and distributions.

#3 – Internal & external governance: Does the Fund provide clarity of its governance structure? (93%)

Clear governance structures support transparency, reputation and alignment with managers, promoting trust and compliance with regulations. The CEOs of Abu Dhabi’s ADIA, and Bahrain’s FGR and Mumtalakat are members of their respective royal families, which may not be perceived as a best practice elsewhere.

Operations

#4 – Structure & operational data: How is the Fund structured as an investment organization? (57%)

The structure and operational data of a fund are crucial in understanding how the investment organization functions, helps stakeholders assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the management, and it reveals operational strengths and weaknesses. . CPP and Australia’s Aware Super only failed to score this point.

#5 – External manager reputation: Is there a robust process to select external managers, if any? (54%)

This question gauges if the fund follows transparency and maintains a robust process when appointing external parties to manage part of their portfolios, in order to avoid recent cases such as Malaysia’s 1MDB with PetroSaudi, and Angola’s FSDEA with Quantum Global. Over half of SWFs are still not providing such details.

#6 – Annual accounts audited: Are financial statements audited and in the public domain? (74%)

Publicly available audited financial statements build investor trust, demonstrate compliance with regulatory standards, help stakeholders evaluate the fund's financial health, and mitigate the risk of financial misreporting and fraud. We could find the audited statements of 63% of the SWFs and of 85% of the PPFs.

Transparency

#7 – Investment strategy & criteria: What kind of assets does the Fund seek to invest in? (90%)

The investment strategy should specify the type of assets the fund seeks to invest in and any criteria businesses must meet to receive funding. This helps align the fund's objectives with stakeholder expectations. 13% of the sovereign funds and 7% of the pension funds still failed to disclose the kinds of assets they invest in.

#8 – Details of investment portfolio: Does the Fund provide clarity on what assets it currently holds? (69%)

An increasing number of State-Owned Investors offer an insight into their major portfolio investments. A few provide a comprehensive account of every holding, including their market value. These include Japan’s GPIF, New Zealand’s NZ Super, Norway’s NBIM (except for real estate), and USA-California’s CalPERS.

#9 – AuM figure public: Does the Fund provide clarity on how much capital it manages? (87%)

26 SOIs do not disclose the size of their balance sheet, half of which are in the MENA region: UAE’s ADIA, ADPF, DH, EIA, GPSSA, and SAM; Kuwait’s KIA and PIFSS; Qatar’s QIA; Saudi Arabia’s NDF; Bahrain’s SIO; Egypt’s TSFE; and Morocco’s Ithmar.

#10 – Annual vs LT return: Is the most recent year’s return provided? (67%)

Providing the most recent year’s return allows a comparison with long-term performance, offering insights into the fund's consistency and overall strategy effectiveness. For example, ADIA and GIC continue to provide multi-year rolling returns only, and this year, Mubadala went back to providing multi-year returns only, too.

Sustainability: 10 elements (into brackets, % of SOIs that scored every element)

Policies

#11 – ESG risk management: Does the Fund accept and address climate change and other ESG risks? (59%)

Addressing climate change and other ESG risks is crucial for comprehensive risk management and for sustainable long-term performance and stakeholder confidence. Only 59% of the Top 200 funds incorporate ESG considerations broadly, with pension funds (72%) more likely to do so than sovereign wealth funds (45%).

#12 – Sustainability team in place: Does the Fund employ a dedicated team for Responsible Investing? (50%)

Despite the growing focus on sustainability, 61 sovereign wealth funds and 39 public pension funds still lack Sustainability-focused teams. Some of these funds claim to integrate sustainability factors into their investment decisions, but there is no dedicated team. Two funds ticked this box for the first time in 2024.

#13 – Reference to SDGs: Is the Fund a UNPRI signatory member or does it align with the SDGs? (54%)

Evaluating whether a fund is a UNPRI signatory or aligns with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is critical for assessing its commitment to sustainability. There is a 4% increase in the funds that have aligned to these ideals but only 34% of the SOIs, including 13 SWFs and 51 PPFs, are signatory members of the UNPRI.

Action

#14 – Exclusion / Engagement: Does the Fund maintain an exclusion list and / or engagement policy? (50%)

This is one of the new elements introduced in 2024, and it seeks a proactive approach to managing ESG risks by excluding certain investments and/or maintaining clear engagement policies. Only 35% of SWFs manage to score this point, while many PPFs elaborate these policies in detail, including European funds APG and Alecta.

#15 – Emerging markets / managers: Does the Fund invest in emerging markets and / or managers? (80%)

A substantial portion of SOIs originate from emerging economies and invest domestically. Other funds choose to invest through emerging managers, highlighting their commitment to fostering new talent and capitalizing on high-growth opportunities, e.g., New York Common (US$ 10.2 bn) and Texas TRS (US$ 5.9 bn) in the US.

#16 – Net-Zero Commitment: Has the Fund committed to net-zero goals by a certain timeline? (33%)

This element is newly introduced as we believe setting specific timelines shows a proactive stance on reducing carbon footprints and meeting global climate objectives. Several funds contribute to the country level net-zero aims but do not necessarily commit to the carbon neutrality of their portfolio.

#17 – Economic mission: Does the Fund seek economic and / or social advancement? (52%)

This goal is often tied to strategic funds or impact investors with broader objectives, such as fostering host economy development alongside financial returns. This is the only element in which SWFs materially beat PPFs, due to the emergence of strategic funds with domestic development agendas, such as NIIF, INA or Maharlika.

Reporting

#18 – Adherence: Does the Fund adhere to any best practice framework, e.g., TCFD? (39%)

This element has been also added to the mix and it seeks adherence to a reputable and thorough sustainability framework, such as TCFD or SASB - beyond any membership to international bodies (e.g., OPSWF). Some funds issue a report according to TCFD (e.g., Temasek), while others lay out the roadmap to adoption (e.g., BCI).

#19 – ESG annual report: Does the Fund produce an annual, meaningful sustainability report / section? (48%)

This question seeks a standalone responsible investing report, or a meaningful section in the annual report, published on a regular basis. Only 48% of the sample meet the requirement today, with a 10% increase from last year. Some sustainability reports could still use more specific KPIs and progress, and less generic literature.

#20 – Economic impact & measure: Are ESG key metrics or figures provided? (48%)

Funds with economic goals should report appropriate KPIs, and these are normally included in an annual ESG report. Even those that do not yet issue ESG reports can report metrics regularly, e.g., Saudi’s PIF (employment and GDP contribution). 48% of the funds, including 32 SWFs and 63 PPFs, ticked this box in 2024.

Resilience: 5 elements  (into brackets, % of SOIs that scored every element)

Legitimacy

#21 – Policy for withdrawals: Is there a mechanism to avoid the depletion of the Fund in the long term? (30%)

  #23 for SWFs: Is there a specific mechanism to avoid depletion?

  #23 for PPFs: Is the funding status disclosed and if so, is it 100% or above?

A mechanism to prevent the depletion of the fund is crucial, yet only 30% have such measures in place. For SWFs, this involves specific withdrawal limits or conditions, with only 36% meeting the criteria. For PPFs, it requires maintaining (and disclosing) a fully funded status (100% or more), which only 22% of them have.

#22 – Risk Management policy: Does the Fund have a robust risk management framework in place? (71%)

Having a comprehensive and robust risk management policy available to the public ensures transparency and accountability. While many institutions mention risk management on their websites, only 63% of sovereign funds and 78% of pension funds provide detailed explanations in their annual reports or online.

Adaptation

#23 – Strategic asset allocation: Is there proper thought behind the asset allocation of the Fund? (65%)

A strategic asset allocation is crucial for defining liquidity levels and ensuring resilience during uncertainty. However, some very large strategic funds, like Dubai’s ICD, Abu Dhabi’s ADQ, Turkey’s TVF or Kazakhstan’s Samruk Kazyna, do not provide guidelines or insights into their asset classes, liquidity, or types of securities.

#24 – BCM / Crisis team in place: Does the Fund employ a dedicated Operational Risk team? (52%)

The presence of a dedicated Operational Risk, Enterprise Risk Management or Business Continuity Management (BCM) team is crucial for operating robustly and seamlessly during crises, as highlighted during the Covid-19 pandemic. Currently, only 52% of the funds (44 SWFs and 60 PPFs) have this in place.

#25 – Speed & discipline: Is the Fund generally well placed for its long-term survival? (34%)

Evaluating whether a fund is well placed for long-term survival involves a degree of judgment based on insights into its operations and finances. Although some funds may meet many criteria and show adaptability to crises, only 34% are deemed robust enough for long-term survival.

Per mission: As highlighted before in this report, public pension funds fare better than sovereign funds when it comes to best practices. Among SWFs, those tasked with a savings mission score better in governance and resilience, while strategic funds fare better in sustainability because of their domestic development goals. Stabilization funds are designed to be used during crises and may be vulnerable to depletion in the long run.

Per size: We previously stated that the largest funds are not necessarily the most successful in terms of financial returns, but when it comes to GSR, size ensures robustness: the 40 extra-large funds, with AuM over US$ 180 bn perform better than the rest, especially around resilience. The large and medium funds perform similarly well, while those below US$ 43 bn in AuM fail the test in terms of long-term survival.

Per age: The oldest group of sovereign investors, which we can call senior funds aged over 67 years old, present the best performance around governance. The adult funds with ages between 20 and 66 have the best sustainability and resilience scores. The teenager funds have passed the “G” and “S” exams by now but need more work on legitimacy, while the junior funds under 12 years old are still finding their feet.

Per liquidity: As in previous years, we demonstrate that too much liquidity or illiquidity is not good. “Super liquid” funds lack progress on responsible investment and resilience, while those that are “super illiquid” address sustainability but not legitimacy issues. The SOIs with the best practices GSR-wise are those that have invested between 81% and 95% in public markets, and between 5% and 19% in private markets.

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